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MALPRACTICE: THE DESIGN
PROFESSIONAL'S DILEMMA
After years of relative legal obscurity, the professional practitioner has recently become the subject of increased legislative
and judicial attention. Once a rare target of lawsuits, the professional finds himself an increasingly, if disquietingly, popular
source of litigation. With the costs of judgments and settlements
escalating, and malpractice insurance becoming prohibitively expensive-when available, many professionals have become
acutely aware of the need for legislative and judicial protection.
While the legal profession has always kept abreast of its own
malpractice situation and has, especially of late, devoted disproportionate attention to the problems of medical practitioners, the
position of the design professional1 has received relatively little
attention. When one considers that without the product this professional provides, none would be able to comfortably practice
their skills, the design professional's situation acquires considerable additional significance.
The malpractice problem can be divided into and is predominated by two basic issues: first, what are the grounds for bringing a malpractice action against a design professional and second,
when does the action accrue and how long may a potential plaintiff wait before pursuing his available remedies? During the
past ten years, Illinois case law has developed significantlyalong with the latent awareness of the problems associated with
professional malpractice. It is the purpose of this article to explore the development of the design professional's malpractice
liability and to suggest a possible method of approaching some
of the more serious problems which may arise in this area of
the law.
CAUSES OF ACTION

Who is an "Architect"?
In Illinois, architects are licensed and regulated under chapter 10/2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. 2 Section 1 requires that
any person practicing "architecture" obtain a certificate of regis1. Within the context of this article, the term "design professional"
is intended to designate any practitioner who renders services of actual
design and planning, or who acts as a consultant to or an analyst for
one who does, and who is licensed to do so by the state. An architect,
engineer and surveyor would be included under this definition whereas
a draftsman, specification writer, laborer or the like would not.
2. Commonly known as "The Illinois Architectural Act," ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 101Y2, § 19 (1975).

288

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10:287

tration from the state3 while section two defines the generic
term. 4 The Act provides that an architect shall be certified only
after he has met the educational requirements established by the
Department of Registration and Education 5 and has passed an
examination designed "to ascertain the qualifications and fitness
of applicants for certificates of registration as registered architects."
In discussing an earlier similar statute, the Illinois Supreme
Court in the case of People v. Rodgers Co.,7 explained the rationale behind the licensing requirement, i.e., "[t] he real purpose
of the statute is the protection of the public against incompetent
architects, from whose services damage might result to the public
by reason of dangerous and improperly constructed buildings and
by badly ventilated and poorly lighted buildings.,"
In compliance with this expressed intent of the Illinois legislature, the
courts have consistently held that "architects must exercise reasonable care in the performance of their duties and may be liable
to persons who may foreseeably be injured by their failure to
exercise such care." 9 The skill and ability an architect is bound
to exercise is that which is ordinarily required of architects. Any
failure by an architect to so perform establishes a prima facie
case of negligence and can lead to a malpractice action. Under
section 13, an architect can lose his registration as a result of
his failure to exercise such reasonable care. 10
There has never been any question that an architect in a
malpractice action can be found liable for negligence in design
or specification. 1' Problems in establishing liability may arise,
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 101/2, § 1 (1975).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10 , § 2 (1975):
Architect means a person who is technically qualified and registered under the laws of this State to practice architecture. The practice of architecture within the meaning and intent of this Act includes the offering or furnishing of any professional services such
as consultation, planning, aesthetic and structural design, drawings
and specifications, or responsible supervision of construction, or erection, in connection with the construction of any private or public
buildings, building structures, building projects, or addition to or alteration thereof.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10 , § 8 (1975).
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10Y2, § 4a(1) (1975).
7. 277 Ill. 151, 115 N.E. 146 (1917).
8. Id. at 155, 115 N.E. at 148.
9. See, e.g., Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 283, 226 N.E.2d 630, 637
(1967).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10 , § 13 (1975):
The Department of Registration and Education may refuse to
renew, may suspend or may revoke any certificate of registration
for any one or any combination of the following causes:
(a) gross incompetency;
(b) recklessness in the design, planning or supervision of construction of buildings or their appurtenances.
11. See Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Voss
v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 520, 328 N.E.2d 297 (1975). See
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however, when a cause of action is brought against an architect
based upon a theory of negligent supervision. Because of the
peculiar problems inherent in construction accidents, Illinois has
adopted a Structural Work Act 1 2 which specifically addresses this
question.
Structural Work Act
The Illinois Structural Work Act was designed to provide
a comprehensive guide as regards the way structural work is to
be designed, erected and supervised, 13 as well as the manner in
which litigation arising in connection therewith is to be conducted. 14 Under the Act it is the responsibility of the person
"having charge of" the work to insure compliance with the statutory provisions. 1 5 Willful failure to do so subjects that party
to criminal liability. 6
What is meant by the person "having charge of" the work
has long been a troublesome question since the Act itself does
not define the term. The case of Miller v. DeWitt 7 has probably
done the most to interpret the phrase and in so doing, precipitated a partial revision of the standard form American Institute
18
of Architects Owner-Architect Agreement.
also Comment, Liability of Design Professionals-The Necessity of Fault,
58 IOWA L. REv. 1221, 1235 (1973): "Thus, while attempts have been made
to recover from a design professional without the need to prove negligence, the general rule appears to remain that where the function is design, the plaintiff will have to prove negligence."
12. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1975).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1975)..
14. Id. at § 69.
15. The relevant statutory language states that "[a]ny owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person having charge of the
erection, construction, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any
building, bridge, viaduct or other structure within the provisions of this
act, shall comply with all the terms thereof." Id.

16. Id.

17. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). See notes 23-32 and accompanying text infra.
18. The American Institute of Architects [hereinafter referred to as
the A.I.A.] is a national society whose primary membership consists of
registered architects. Part of the service it provides is the preparation
and periodic updating of standard form contracts to be used by the attorneys of design professionals and others involved in the planning and construction or alteration of structures. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
ARCHITECTS, THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUC-

TION, (AIA Document A201, Aug. 1976 ed.). All future references to
standard form contracts prepared by the American Institute of Architects
can be found in AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA BUILDING CONSTRUCTION LEGAL CrrATOR (1973). Because all related materials comprise
the "Contract Documents," to which every contract refers, all documents
must be considered when interpreting the language of any particular one.

The 1963

STANDARD

FORM

OF AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

OWNER

AND

ARCHITECT, (AIA Document B131, Sept. 1963 ed.), gave the architect general supervisory powers. Article 18 of the General Conditions of the 1963
STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR,

Document A107, Sept. 1963 ed.), provided:

(AIA

"The Architect shall be the
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In 1965, when Miller was decided, the standard form agreement' 9 gave the architect general supervisory powers which included the right to stop the work whenever the architect deemed
it necessary. The court first noted that "the general duty to 'supervise the work' merely creates a duty to see that the building
when constructed meets the plans and specifications contracted
for. ' 20 The majority, proceeding on the inarticulated premise
that the power to stop the work is not part of the ordinary supervisory controls and duties of an architect, then ruled that "the
architects'- right to stop the work if it were being done in a dangerous manner makes them persons 'having charge' within the
meaning of the [Structural Work Act]."21 Thus, the term "having charge of" the work was given meaning as regards the liability of architects.
Even at the time of the Miller decision, the architect was
not customarily on the job site every day, let alone all day. Pursuant to contract or custom, a superintendent of construction was
normally hired and given authority to run the job. In light of
Miller, it was conceivable that should the superintendent err,
such error causing injury, damage, or death, the architect could
be the one found responsible in a liability action. As a direct
result of the Miller ruling, therefore, all subsequent standard
form A.I.A. contracts were revised in order to eliminate, by way
of remaining silent on the point, the architect's power to stop
22
the work.

Miller v. DeWitt
The 1965 appellate court opinion in the case of Miller v. DeWitt,23 and its final resolution by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Owner's representative during the construction period. He has authority
to stop the work if necessary to insure its proper execution. ... ."
Subsequent to the Illinois Supreme Court disposition of the Miller
case, see text accompanying notes 23-32 infra, the 1970 revision of the

General Conditions of the STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
OWNER AND CONTRACTOR, (AIA Document A107, Sept. 1970 ed.), remained silent as to the architect's right to stop the work and paragraph
9.6, the closest equivalent to former article 18, was revised to state: "The
architect will have authority to reject Work which does not conform to
the Contract Documents."
19. STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND. ARCHITECT,
Document B131, Sept. 1963 ed.); STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR, (AIA Document A107, Sept. 1963

(AIA

ed.).
THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION,
(AIA Document A201, Sept. 1963 ed.), stated in pertinent part: "[The

Architect] shall have authority to stop the work whenever such stoppage
may be necessary in his reasonable opinion to insure the proper execution of the Contract."
20. 37 Ill. 2d at 284, 226 N.E.2d at 638.
21. Id. at 286, 226 N.E.2d at 639.
22. See THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, (AIA Document A201, Aug. 1976 ed.) and note 18 supra.
23. 59 Ill. App. 2d 38, 208 N.E.2d 249 (1965).
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1967,24 remains the landmark decision regarding the obligations,
duties and liability of architects in the State of Illinois and has
been influential within the field of design professional malpractice.
The Owner-Architect Agreement in Miller, taken from an
A.I.A. standard form, 25 required the architects to provide both
design and supervisory services. Separate provision, however,
was made for a clerk-of-the-works and a superintendent of construction to remain on the job site all day. By common practice,
the superintendent was held to have detailed and constant control over the method and manner of the work. Article 15 of
the construction contract between the builder and the school
board (the owner-client) impliedly gave the architects the power
to change or stop the work "in an emergency endangering life
or property. '' 26 Article 38 gave the architects express power to
"stop the work whenever such stoppage [was] necessary to insure the proper execution of the Contract. '27 It is important
to note that prior to the Miller case, the right of the architect
to stop the work was regarded as a mere facet of the architect's
general supervisory powers and was never intended to make him
the party "having charge." This has been dramatically underscored by the deletion of all right-to-stop-work language from
28
A.I.A. standard form contracts following the ruling in Miller.
24. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).

All further citations to Mil-

ler are to the Illinois Supreme Court decision.
Defendant architects were retained to design an addition to an existing school gymnasium and supervise the construction thereof. Pursuant
to the defendants' plans, the alteration proceeded and required the removal of a bearing wall and the columns contained therein. Because
the function of the columns was to provide vertical support for the roof,
it was necessary to "shore" them up so as to assure the continued integrity of the roof. "Shoring" is a procedure whereby a secondary support
system is built around or next to the primary system so that such primary system can be safely removed without a structural collapse. While
removing the columns, the roof collapsed resulting in injury to the plaintiffs. The architects' alleged failure to properly supervise the shoring
operation formed the basis for the negligence claim.
25. See note 19 supra.
26. 37 Ill. 2d at 282, 226 N.E.2d at 636.
27. Id. at 282, 226 N.E.2d at 637. It appears that this language was
taken directly from THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, (AIA Document A201, Sept. 1963 ed.).
28. See note 18 supra. Since the 1970 revision of Document A201, all
subsequent editions of the standard form construction contract have remained silent as to the architect's right to stop the work. The most recently revised form of THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR
CONSTRUCTION,

completed in August of 1976, provides in paragraph 2.2.13

(the closest equivalent to former article 38):
The Architect will have authority to reject Work which does not
conform to the Contract Documents ....
However, neither Architect's authority to act under this Subparagraph 2.2.13, nor any decision made by him in good faith either to exercise or not to exercise
such authority, shall give rise to any duty or responsibility of the
Architect to the Contractor, any Subcontractor, any of their agents
or employees, or any other person performing any of the Work
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Initially, the court had noted that the general duty of architectural supervision merely entailed assuring technical compliance with plans and specifications. 29 It was, in the court's opinion, the contractual delegation to the architects, primarily
through article 38, of the power to stop the work when an unsafe condition existed that extended the defendants' duty beyond
that of verifying technical compliance. Because of the complexity of the work involved, the court intimated that the architects
were negligent in failing to inspect and supervise the work. 0
Since the architects' lax supervision was responsible for their ignorance, the architects could not claim lack of knowledge as a
defense: "[I] f the architects knew or in the exercise of reasonable
care should have known that the shoring was inadequate and
unsafe, they had the right and corresponding duty to stop the
' 31
work until the unsafe condition had been remedied."
What the Miller court actually did was to equate a "right"
with a "duty", find that the duty had been breached, and thereby
hold that the architects were liable for the resulting injuries. As
noted by the dissent: "[T]he architects 'had the right' to insist
upon a safe and adequate use of [shoring methods]. True, but
to parlay that 'right' into a duty is neither consistent with generally accepted usage nor contemplated by the contract.13 2 This
expansion of contract language has been directly criticized by
an Arizona appellate court in Reber v. Chandler High School District #22,33 which commended Justice House's dissent. The Miller court's interpretation of the language in the Owner-Architect
Agreement, therefore, remains a questionable proposition, although never expressly overruled by an Illinois court.
Implicitly however, the Miller ruling has been distinguished.
In the second half of the decision, which deals with architects'
liability under the Structural Work Act,3 4 Justice Underwood
stated: "[W]hat we heretofore have said regarding the architects' right to stop the work if it were being done in a dangerous
manner makes them persons 'having charge' within the meaning
of the act."'35 Subsequent cases have carefully distinguished between the retention of ordinary supervisory powers and the authority to control the manner and method of construction and
work.86
29. 37 Ill. 2d at 284, 226 N.E.2d at 638.
30. Id. at 286, 226 N.E.2d at 639.
31. Id. at 285, 226 N.E.2d at 638 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 293-94, 226 N.E.2d at 643 (House, J., dissenting).
33. 13 Ariz. App. 133, 138, 474 P.2d 852, 854-55 (1970).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1975). See notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
35. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 286, 226 N.E.2d 630. 639 (1967).
36. See Voss v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 520, 527, 328 N.E.2d

297, 301 (1975) and text accompanying notes 43-49 infra. See also Mc-
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In an attempt to focus the Miller equation, it must be noted
that it is the specific contractual right of the architect to stop
the work which identifies him as the person "having charge."
The current form A.I.A. documents 37 are silent as to the architect's right to stop the work and expressly reserve that power
to the owner. 38 Omission of this language is apparently sufficient to render the architect a mere inspector and not a guarantor
of job safety with respect to the construction methods employed. 39 As such, the Miller equation of right to stop the work
with duty to stop the work with person in charge has been tacitly
qualified.
Although the major thrust of the Miller decision was to make
an architect liable for negligent supervision of the methods and
manner of construction, notwithstanding what was believed to
be the general supervision language of the contract, the court's
rationale has been largely unemployed in subsequent practice
due to carefully drafted contracts. Further, even though Miller
held that the architects were liable, it did allow them a third
party action against the general contractor actually responsible
for the shoring.40 This was done under the Illinois rule "in favor
of allowing a third party who was not actively negligent to obtain indemnification from an employer who was actively negligent. '41 The court additionally noted that even if liability attaches to those "having charge of" the work pursuant to a willful violation of the Structural Work Act, "this does not mean
that persons found liable thereunder are necessarily active
wrongdoers. '42 Thus, the possibility for indemnification under
Illinois law exists even when litigation occurs under the Structural Work Act and the architect's liability is based upon a theory
of negligent supervision.
Govern v. Standish, 33 Ill. App. 3d 717, 719-20, 341 N.E.2d 739, 741 (1975)
and text accompanying notes 50-68 infra. There is an acknowledged difference between having the power to "stop" work (i.e., order it to cease

entirely) and possessing the authority to direct that the work be done
in a given manner.
37. See note 28 supra.
38. The most recent form of THE GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CON(AIA Document A201, Aug. 1976 ed.), provides
in paragraph 3.3, Owner's Right to Stop the Work:
TRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION,

3.3.1 If the Contractor fails to correct defective work as required
[by the General Conditions] or persistently fails to carry out the
Work in accordance with the Contract Documents, the Owner, by a
written order signed personally or by an agent specifically so empowered by the Owner in writing, may order the Contractor to stop
the Work, or any portion thereof, until the cause for such order has

been eliminated ....
39. See, e.g., Voss v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 520, 527, 328

N.E.2d 297, 301 (1975).

40. 37 Ill. 2d at 288-92, 226 N.E.2d at 640-42.
41. Id. at 289, 226 N.E.2d at 640.
42. Id. at 291, 226 N.E.2d at 641.
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Subsequent Cases
Not until 1975 did the Illinois Supreme Court again confront
the issue of whether a design professional has charge of the work
by the mere retention of power to stop the work. In Voss v.
Kingdon & Naven, Inc.,43 the defendant was an engineering firm
retained by the city of Pekin, Illinois, to act as an analyist, a
consultant and a supervisor on a sewer project undertaken by
the city. The plaintiff, was an employee of the contracting firm
which had been hired to execute the work. He was injured when
a scaffold he had stepped on collapsed, presumably due to the
fact that a vertical support had been improperly removed. In
an action to recover damages for his injuries the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant was in charge of the work pursuant to section
44
69 of the Structural Work Act.
Section 8-8 of the Owner-Contractor Agreement, which had
been drawn by the defendant, expressly gave the engineers the
power to stop the work at their discretion. In a trial on the
merits, the defendant argued that it was not in Charge of the
work as defined in section 69 of the Structural Work Act and
received a directed verdict. On appeal, however, the directed
verdict was reversed and the defendant appealed.
The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the term "having
charge of" was not an easy one to define and was capable of
many interpretations. 45 Quoting from Larson v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 46 a pre-Miller decision dealing with the interpretation
of contract language, the court pointed out:
'"To have charge of" does not necessarily imply more than to
care for or to have the care of.' [People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 323,
178 N.E. 133, 148 (1931)] .. . [T]he thrust of the [Structural Work Act] is not confined to those who perform, or supervise, or control, or who retain the right to supervise and control,
the actual work from which the injury arises, but, to insure maximum protection, is made to extend to owners and others who
have charge
of the erection or alteration of any building or
47
structure.
Drawing a clear parallel between Voss and Miller v. DeWitt,48 the court stated, quoting from Miller, that "'the architects'
right to stop the work if it were being done in a dangerous manner makes them persons "having charge" within the meaning of
the act.' 49 Because the granting of a directed verdict was im43. 60 Ill.
2d 520, 328 N.E.2d 297 (1975).
44. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1975). See note 15 supra.
45. 60 Ill. 2d at 525, 328 N.E.2d at 300.
46. 33 Ill. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
47. 60 Ill. 2d at 525-26, 328 N.E.2d at 300 (citing Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill.
2d 316, 321-22, 211 N.E.2d 247, 251 (1965)).
48. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
49. 60 Ill. 2d 520, 527, 328 N.E.2d 297, 301 (1975) (citing Miller v.
DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 286, 226 N.E.2d 630, 639 (1967)).
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proper, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the reversal and remanded for a new trial.
Even more recently, in the case of McGovern v. Standish,50

the Illinois Supreme Court had the opportunity to determine
whether an architect who possesses only supervisory powers is
in charge of the work and thereby liable for injuries resulting
from a failure to comply with the provisions of the Structural
Work Act. The opinion is an extremely significant one in that
the court set forth specific interpretive guidelines and established
definite limitations on applying the Miller decision. In so doing,
the court also placed the entire question of design professional
malpractice in much sharper focus.
The plaintiff in McGovern was injured when he fell from
a scaffold while working on a construction project for which the
defendant was the architect. Under the Structural Work Act,
section 69 provides that any willful failure by the person "having
charge of" the work to comply with the provisions of the Act,
which failure results in an injury to a workman, shall subject
such person to an action for damages brought by the injured
party.5 1 Since defendant was the architect of the project and
made periodic inspections at the job site, plaintiff sought to subject him to liability as the person "having charge of" the work.
In the trial court, the jury returned a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. Subsequent to the appellate court's reversal thereof, 52
the plaintiff appealed.
In affirming the appellate court's decision, the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the contention that the Structural
Work Act provides a cause of action to an injured workman
against the person in charge of the work, but concluded, in agreement with the appellate court, that the architect was not that
person.53 In reaching its decision, the court carefully reviewed
the architect's contracts 54 and the job site operating procedures. 5
50. 65 Ill. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 60-69 (1975).

52. 33 Ill. App. 3d 717, 341 N.E.2d 739 (1975).
53. 65 Ill. 2d at 69, 357 N.E.2d at 1142.

54. The contracts for professional services between the owner and
architect appear to have been taken from the 1967 STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN

Sept. 1967

OWNER AND

ARCHITECT, (AIA Document

ed.) and the 1967 GENERAL CONDrrIoNS OF

THE

B131,

CONTRACT FOR

CONSTRUCTION, (AIA Document A201, Sept. 1967 ed.). The documents
provided, inter alia, that the architect was to "guard the Owner against
defects and deficiencies in the work of the Contractors," that the owner
alone had the power to stop the work and that "[t]he general administration of the Architect is to be distinguished from the continuous onsite inspection of a Project Inspector." Id. at 63-64, 357 N.E.2d at 11381139.
Mention is made of a set of "Special Conditions of the contract" between the owner and defendant-architect which provided in pertinent
part that "the contractor shall submit to the architect a description of
the methods, sequence of erection, and type of equipment proposed for
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Based thereon and closely following the rule of Miller v. DeWitt,", the court held that a person is in charge of the work
when he has the authority to control the details of performance
or order work done in a dangerous manner stopped at his discretion. Ordinarily, such authority is delegated by contract, but the
Miller court recognized the fact that course of dealing can be
equally determinative. In McGovern, there was neither a contractual provision nor a customary procedure.
In determining who was in charge of the work, the McGovern court adopted a bifurcated approach. It first considered what
the words of the Act have been interpreted to mean and then
examined what effect the Miller decision had on that determination. The court cited with approval two propositions expressed
in Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co.: 5 1 "[s]ince the term
'having charge of' is one of common usage and understanding,
it has not been specifically defined by this court. . . . Nevertheless, before a defendant may be found to be in charge of the
work, there must be a showing that he had some direct connection with the construction operations." '
Not only was the absence of a specific definition acknowledged, but the necessity of
a "direct connection" with actual construction work was affirmed
as a prerequisite to an individual's being found in charge of the
work and thereby potentially liable under the Structural Work
Act. The court further indicated that the potential defendant
"must have been in charge of the particular operations which
involved the violation from which the alleged injury arose. ' ' 9
Thus, the original Miller equation of the right to stop the work
with the person "having charge of" the work was modified to
require that the person "having charge of" the work not only
use in the erection of structural steel work; all work must be done to
the complete approval of the architect .... ." Id. at 65-66, 357 N.E.2d at
1140. Since the court paid no further attention to this provision, it seems
reasonable to assume that there was something else in the record to either rebut or qualify the implications of its language. If not, then the
inescapable question arises of whether this provision does not, in fact,
give the architect control of the "manner and method of construction"
which the courts consistently regard as highly probative. If it does, then
there is an irreconcilable inconsistency in the court's reasoning. See text
accompanying note 66 infra.
It is also worth noting that the most recent STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITEcT, (AIA Document B141, Jan. 1974
ed.) expressly provides in subparagraph 1.1.14 that "[t]he Architect shall
not be responsible for the construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions and programs in connection with the Work. . . ." (Emphasis added).
55. Testimony at trial clearly established that the architect neither
gave orders relating to actual construction procedures nor sought to exercise any control thereover.
56. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
57. 33 Ill. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
58. 65 Ill. 2d at 66-67, 357 N.E.2d at 1141 (citing Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 323-24, 211 N.E.2d 247, 251-52 (1965)),
59. 65 Ill. 2d at 67, 357 N.E.2d at 1141 (emphasis added).
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have some immediate connection with the physical construction
but also with that particular aspect of the construction which
gives rise to the statutory violation and injury claim. From the
general and somewhat vague rule of the Miller decision, the court
moved to the specific and unequivocally definite.
After considering its earlier decision in Miller, the court
stated, "we do not read Miller as holding that the right to stop
the work, without more, is conclusive in resolving the question
of whether a person has charge of the work within the meaning
of the Act." 60 This qualification of the Miller opinion is of major
importance. It arguably represents an acknowledgement by the
court of the overbreadth of Miller and the questionable equation
therein of the right to stop the work with the person having
charge thereof. In an apparent attempt to justify the Miller
holding on this new, clearer enunciation of the Miller doctrine,
the McGovern court pointed out that the defendants in Miller
had the right to stop the work "if it were being done in a dangerous manner." 61 Though inarticulated, the court seemed to equate
this right with a power to control the manner of construction,
thus providing the something "more" which the new interpretation of Miller requires. Because the defendant in McGovern
failed to fulfill the requirements of both parts of the bifurcated
test, he could not be found liable as the person "having charge
62
of" the work under the Act.
Apart from the specific applications of fact to law and the
conclusions based thereon, the court made several general findings which are of keen interest and will undoubtedly affect future malpractice actions brought under the Structural Work Act
against supervising architects. Perhaps most significant was the
court's recognition that there is no general rule which will summarily answer the question of whether a particular defendant
was the person "having charge of" the work (and thereby liable)
under the Act. 3 Equally important was the court's articulation
of the fact that an architect's "right to reject defective materials
and workmanship and require its correction '6 4 is not the equivalent of a blanket right to stop work being done in a dangerous
manner. Similarly, the owner's right to stop the work on certification of the architect is not enough, in and of itself, to impose
60. Id. at 68, 357 N.E.2d at 1141.
61. Id. at 68, 357 N.E.2d at 1141.
62. Id. at 69, 357 N.E.2d at 1142.

63. "[S]uch a determination must rest upon an assessment of the

totality of circumstances." Id. at 68, 357 N.E.2d at 1141.
64. Id. at 68, 357 N.E.2d at 1141. This language is substantially sim-

ilar to that used in subparagraph 2.2.13 of the most recent GENERAL
CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, (AIA Document A201,
Aug. 1976 ed.).

298 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 10:287
liability on the architect. 65
Ultimately, the court reached and addressed the pivotal question, raised but unanswered in Miller, which has troubled lower
courts ever since: whether the mere retention of ordinary supervisory powers is enough to make an architect the person in
charge of the work. The McGovern court clearly distinguished
between the power to verify technical compliance with plans and
specifications and the "right to control or direct the manner or
methods by which the construction [will] be accomplished." 60
This difference has finally found clear, unequivocal expression:
[A]s a general rule, even the 'duty to "supervise the work"
merely creates a duty to see that the building when constructed
meets the plans and specifications contracted for.' (Miller v.
Dewitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 284.) The right to inspect the work, also
given the defendant, is but ancillary to the defendant's right to
supervise. These rights, as afforded the defendant in this case,
cannot
alone form a basis for a finding of coverage under the
7
Act.

6

McGovern clearly indicates, and is substantial authority for
the proposition that the design professional cannot, in the absence of some agreement or act enlarging the scope of his usual
services, be held liable for the misfeasance of other persons involved in the construction of a given structure. The decision
is of undeniable benefit to design professionals because of the
precision with which it phrases the relevant considerations and
the clarity with which it addresses them. Almost as though
echoing the fears of the profession, instilled by previous litigation, the court concluded, "[w]ere the defendant to be held in
charge of the work on these facts, he would in essence be subjected to liability as a result of his status as a supervising architect alone."""
In a number of other states, however, the courts have not
entirely agreed with the basic Miller reasoning which all Illinois
courts continue to follow. In the case of Reber v. Chandler High
School District #202,6 9 the Owner-Architect Agreement provided
that the architect was to furnish, "general supervision to guard
the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the work of contractors, but he [the architect] does not guarantee the performance of their contracts."7 0 Because the general contractor failed
to observe proper procedures, an employee was seriously injured
during a structural collapse while steel was being erected. The
65. 65 Ill. 2d at 69, 357 N.E.2d at 1142.
66. Id. at 69, 357 N.E.2d at 1142.
67. Id. at 69, 357 N.E.2d at 1142 (emphasis added).

68. Id. at 70, 357 N.E.2d at 1142 (emphasis added).

accompanying note 84 infra.
69. 13 Ariz. App. 133, 474 P.2d 852 (1970),
70. Id. at 138, 474 P.2d at 855.

See also text
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injured employee sought to hold the owner and the architect
liable under a negligent supervision theory.
Recognizing the fact that there are varying degrees of supervision, the Arizona appellate court held that, "liability for negligent exercise of retained supervisory powers can attach only
when there is a showing that a duty has been created by the
reservation of '. . . the right to exercise day-by-day control over
the manner in which the details of the work are performed.'"71
In effect, the Reber decision requires that the party named as
defendant must have control over the method or manner of doing
the actual details of the work, as opposed to merely verifying,
by means of an inspection, that the work as performed conforms
to the controlling plans and specifications.7 2 Further, the contract distinguished between the "general supervision" of the
architect and the "continuous on-site inspection by a clerk-ofthe-works." This distinction was held to furnish clear proof of
the parties' intent to limit the architect's function in terms of
supervision to one of assuring technical compliance with the contract documents, and nothing more.
Almost in a passing reference, the Arizona court mentioned
the Illinois Structural Work Act. 73 The court noted that the act
was expressly designed to protect "persons employed or engaged"
in construction activity from negligence on the part of the supervising individual. This protection is extended to the worker, and
its correlative duty is imposed upon the person "having charge,"
by statute and apart from any contractual provisions. As stated
by the Reber court, "[t] he Illinois [Structural Work Act] indeed
is a good example of a legislature's ability to express its intent
to protect workmen, from which a duty of supervision with re' 74
spect to discharging such intent may be inferred.
Other Statutes
In conjunction with the case law pertaining to when a design
professional is liable under a malpractice action, there are two
particular statutes, in addition to the Structural Work Act, which
merit consideration.
Obviously, the most expeditious way for a design professional to eliminate the hazard of a malpractice action is to require
indemnification from the party employing him. In this manner
the party responsible for the professional's employment would
71. Id. at 137, 474 P.2d at 854 (citing E.L. Jones Constr. Co. v. Noland, 105 Ariz. 446, 456, 466 P.2d 740, 750 (1970)).
72. Id. at 138, 474 P.2d at 854.
73. Id. at 139, 474 P.2d at 856-57.
74. Id. at 141, 474 P.2d at 857.
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be required to bear the risk, as well as the loss, of any mishaps
emanating therefrom. Under section 61 of chapter 29-"An Act
in relation to indemnity in certain contracts" 7 5-any

contractual

attempt by a design professional to indemnify himself from liability for his own misfeasance is arguably unenforceable as being
against public policy. Although the act limits its application to
contracts for the "construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance" of structures, an architect's agreement to render design
services is colorably a part of any of the enumerated contracts.
But the actual effect of the section is uncertain since there are
presently no cases on point.
In August of 1969, the Illinois General Assembly passed into
law section 58 of chapter 5170 entitled "An Act regarding claims
in relation to work or service on real property and any product
incorporated therein to become part thereof. '7 7 The act appears
to establish a six year period, commencing to run on the date
of design or completion of the building, whichever occurs later,
during which time the absence of any damage to property or
injury to persons is to be taken as presumptive proof of reasonable care in the design and/or construction of the structure.
Since its enactment in 1969, there has been no litigation involving
this particular statute, and thus the exact nature of the presumption is unclear. Nevertheless, one may reasonably postulate that
the presumption is irrebuttable since an architect is ordinarily
presumed to exercise reasonable care by virtue of his training
and state certification. This usual presumption of reasonable
care has always been rebuttable's and hence to hold that the
same is true under the presumption created by section 58 would
effectively void the Act of real meaning and treat it as a mere
codification of accepted and followed principle. It seems more
reasonable to regard section 58 as a legislative response to the
design professional's dilemma-how long does a design have to
succeed without incident before it will no longer pose the threat
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, § 61 (1975):
With respect to contracts or agreements, either public or private,
for the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building,
structure, highway bridge, viaducts or other work dealing with construction, or for any moving, demolition or excavation connected
therewith, every covenant, promise or agreement to indemnify or
hold harmless another person from that person's own negligence is
void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 58 (1975):
Any work or service on real property or any product incorporated therein to become part of said real property which does not
cause injury or property damage within 6 years after such performance, manufacture, assembly, engineering or design, shall be presumptive proof that such work, service or product was performed,
manufactured, assembled, engineered or designed with reasonable
care by every person doing any of the said acts . . ..
77. Id.
75.

78. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 283, 226 N.E.2d 630, 637 (1967).
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of litigation to its designer? Section 58 appears to conclusively
answer the question with a six year test period.
Of course, section 58 leaves open to the prospective plaintiff
the opportunity of proving willful or wanton misconduct or gross
negligence, but any alleged misfeasance short of this heavy burden will arguably not succeed in overcoming the presumption,
assuming of course that it is conclusive.
As a final note, some mention must be made of attempts to
subject architects to liability under a theory of strict products liability, thus abrogating the need of proving negligence.7 9 There
have not, as of yet, been any cases in the United States in which
a design professional has been held liable under a products liability rationale. However, at least one court has seen fit to find
a builder liable under this theory in a case where his "product"
(a newly constructed house) was faulty and caused injury. 0
While this particular decision has been called part of "a further
and more radical trend by an extreme minority of courts,"81 it
may be regarded as a clear indication of a developing judicial
attitude which favors perpetual liability for persons connected
with real estate. Certainly if a builder can be held liable under
strict products liability theory, how distant is the step on which
his architect stands?
As of today, however, a prospective plaintiff must still prove
negligence in order to succeed in a malpractice action.8 2 Notwithstanding this requirement, at least one commentator has argued that decisions such as Miller v. DeWitt8 3 impose upon the
design professional a duty of going beyond reasonable care "and
amount, in effect, to liability without proof of negligence--strict
'8 4
liability.
WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES

Statutes of Limitations
Having established the grounds upon which a malpractice
action against a design professional can be based, the next inquiry must be as to when that cause of action accrues and when
79. See generally Note, Products Liability-Real Property-BuildersVendors, 8 DUQ. U.L. REv. 407 (1970); Comment, Products and the
Professional: Strict Liability in the Sales-Service Hybrid Transaction,
24 HASTINGs L.J. 111 (1972); Comment, Liability of Design Professionals

-the Necessity of Fault,58 IOwA L. REv. 1221 (1973).

80. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr.

749 (1969).
81. 8 DuQ. U.L. REV. 407, supra note 79, at 415.
82. See authorities cited in note 79 supra.
83. 37 Ill.
2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
84. 58 IOWA L. REv. 1221, supra note 79, at 1243.
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the applicable statute of limitations may or may not be employed
as a defense. Illinois has had an interesting experience with
these considerations and its resolution may well influence many
states that have not yet confronted the problem.
There are two particular statutes of limitations in Illinois
which are germane. Section 15 of chapter 83 provides that any
action to recover for personal injuries "shall be commenced
within two years next after the cause of action accrued."8 5 Similarly, section 16 of chapter 83 provides that any action to recover
for real or personal property damage "shall be commenced within
5 years next after the cause of action accrued."8 6 Since the vast
bulk of litigation involving design professionals stems from personal or property injury, these two statutes are of paramount
importance.
When an architect or engineer has been named as the defendant in a lawsuit, the term "cause of action accrued" is a particularly troublesome one to define. There are two possible interpretations of this term: 1) a cause of action accrues when
the design giving rise to the failure occasioning the injury was
completed or realized (known as the "occurrence type"); or 2)
a cause of action accrues when the failure causing the injury
was manifested, i.e., the date of the actual injury (known as the
"discovery type"). Most courts have relied upon the latter approach and have generally held that the cause of action accrues
when the alleged breach of duty causes the plaintiff to suffer
8
physical pain8 7 or property loss.
If one follows the date of discovery line of reasoning, it becomes apparent that regardless of when a structure was completed, as long as an individual who in some way suffers an injury by way of a structural defect files an action within the statutorily prescribed time limit, the architect must defend. Thus,
a design professional remains perpetually liable for every structure, whenever completed, with which he was connected.8 9
In 1963, perhaps with the intent of limiting the apparent infinite liability of architects, the Illinois legislature added section
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1975): "Actions for damages for an
injury to the person ... shall be commenced within two years next after
the cause of action accrued."
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 16 (1975): "[A]ctions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied . . . or to recover damages for an injury
done to property, real or personal. . . shall be commenced within 5 years
next after the cause of action accrued."
87. See, e.g., Reat v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d 267, 271,
197 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1964).

88. See, e.g., Society of Mt. Carmel v. Fox, 31 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 335

N.E.2d 588 (1975).

89. See 8 DuQ. U.L.

REV.

407, supra note 64.

See also Sears,

Roebuck & Co. v. ENCO Associates, Inc., 54 App. Div. 2d 13, 385
N.Y.S.2d 613 (1976).
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29 to chapter 83. This section provided, inter alia, that no action
to recover for personal injury, property damage or wrongful
death arising out of a defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to realty could be brought against those responsible
for it "unless such cause of action . . . accrued within four years
after the performance or furnishing" of design or construction
services 0 In effect, section 29 allowed the design professional to
rely on the absence of legal notice for nine years after the structure had been completed to signify an end to his potential liability for design defects.9 1
However, this period of relative security for the architect
lasted less than six years. In August of 1969 the Illinois legislature repealed section 2992 pursuant to the 1967 Illinois Supreme
Court holding in Skinner v. Anderson." The Skinner court concluded that section 29 violated article IV, section 22 of the Illinois
90. Act of August 20, 1963, ch. 83, § 29 [1963], Ill. Laws 1963 (now
STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (1975)):
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real
or personal, or for injury to the person, or for bodily injury or
wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of
an improvement to real estate, nor any action for contribution or
indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be
brought against any person performing or furnishing the design,
planning, supervision of construction or construction of such improvement to real property, unless such cause of action shall have
accrued within four years after the performance or furnishing of such
services and construction.
91. In the case of a personal injury suit, the waiting period would
be six years; four years under section 24f plus the two years within
which to bring suit under section 15. In the case of a property damage
action, the discovery period would remain at four years but pursuant
to section 16, the claimant would have five years within which to bring
ILL. REv.

suit thus constituting a total waiting period of nine years.
92. Act of August 20, 1963, ch. 83, § 29 [1963] Ill. Laws 1963 (now
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (1975)).
93. 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967). Defendant architect was
retained in 1956 by the plaintiff's father to design a house. The dwelling was built as designed but defendant failed to provide for ventilation
in the room that contained the air conditioning machinery. Over the
years, escaping gases had seeved into the adjoining boiler room and ultimately caused the boiler to discharge toxic gases which, in 1965, resulted
in the death of plaintiff's husband and daughter and serious injury to
plaintiff herself. Defendant architect was sued on a negligent design
theory. Defendant moved to dismiss based on section 29 of chapter 83
which provided, inter alia, that no action to recover for bodily injury
or wrongful death "arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of
an improvement to real estate," would be permitted unless it accrued
within four years "after the performance or furnishing of such [design]
services and construction." The motion to dismiss was granted.
On appeal, the court reversed, determining that the statute was unconstitutional:
Section 22 of article IV states: 'The general assembly shall not pass
local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that
is to say for:
* * * Granting to any corporation, association or
individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise
whatever.'
The effect of section 29 of the Limitations Act is to grant to architects and contractors a special or exclusive immunity.
Id. at 459, 231 N.E.2d at 590.
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Constitution which prevents the general assembly from granting
any corporation, association or individual a special or exclusive
privilege or immunity of any type. Thus, once again, design professionals were subject to perpetual liability for any design defect
which might manifest itself as long as: 1) the claimant sued
pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations; 2) within the
statutorily prescribed time; and 3) the cause of action was measured from the date of discovery.
Probably as a second attempt to alleviate the problem, the
legislature enacted section 58 of chapter 51 in October of 1969,
which, as previously noted,94 apparently relieves the architect
from responsibility if his design succeeds without incident for
a period of six years or more.
Case Law

The first Illinois case to specifically interpret when the cause
of action accrues in a malpractice action against an architect was
Board of Education v. Joseph J. Duffy Co. 95 Agreeing with the
defendant architect's position that the cause of action accrues as
of the date of occurrence and not as of the date of discovery,
the court stated that "the period of limitations commences when
the negligent act takes place, and is not tolled by the plaintiff's
ignorance of his injury."9 Hence, the initial interpretation given
to the application of the statute of limitations against design professionals in malpractice actions was that of date of occurrence,
clearly what the profession hoped for by way of fixing its potential liability within calculable parameters. Once again, however,
the design professional's security was short-lived.
In August of 1975 an Illinois appellate court handed down
its opinion in Auster v. Keck 97 and, in effect, reversed the Duffy
interpretation of when the cause of action accrues. This case,
94. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra. This section, not
yet litigated, purports to establish a conclusive presumption of reasonable care in design and construction. The presumption becomes operative after the passage of six years measured from the date of such design or construction during which no defects are manifest.
95. 97 Ill. App. 2d 158, 240 N.E.2d 5 (1968). The defendant architectural partnership of Perkins and Will was retained by the plaintiff to
design and supervise the construction of a school complex. Following
completion in 1959, the plaintiff began discovering numerous design and
construction defects. In 1966, plaintiff brought suit against Perkins and
Will and defendant Duffy, the builder.
Perkins and Will answered that the action which was based on negligent design (there was a second count based on breach of contract as
regarded supervision which was ultimately sustained) was barred under
chapter 83, section 16 which required that any action for damage to property be brought within five years after the cause of action accrued.

96. Id. at 161, 240 N.E.2d at 7.
97. 31 Ill.
App. 3d 61, 333 N.E.2d 65 (1975), rev'd on other grounds,

63 Ill. 2d 485, 349 N.E.2d 20 (1976),
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along with Society of Mount Carmel v. Fox,9s delivered the following month, constitute the present state of the law in Illinois
with respect to design professional malpractice actions.
Auster v. Keck
In 1969 the plaintiffs became second purchasers of a home
which had been designed by defendant architect in 1960 and built
shortly thereafter. Soon after the plaintiffs took possession, the
ceiling began to collapse and in 1972 the plaintiffs filed a malpractice action against the architect. Based on section 16 of chapter 83,99 which provides that any action to recover damages for
injury to property must be filed within five years after the cause
of action accrues, defendant moved to dismiss. Because the construction had in fact been completed more than five years prior
to the suit, the trial court agreed with the architect and dismissed the action.
On appeal, the court succinctly stated the interpretation
problem inherent in the "cause of action accrued" language of
section 16: "[W] hen did said statute begin to run-when the
alleged architectural malpractice occurred or when the victims
discovered it as the ceiling collapsed?" 100 Following discovery
rule logic, the court chose the latter approach. In arriving at
this decision, the Auster court traced the gradual acceptance of
the discovery rule in Illinois courts and carefully indicated,
through a citation to Coumoulas v. Service Gas, Inc.,' 01 that the
application of the discovery rule is limited to cases in which the
plaintiff expressly claims that he had no knowledge of the defect
prior to the date of alleged discovery and that such discovery
10 2
occurred less than five years prior to the date of his complaint.
This requirement assures the court that only a plaintiff who is
genuinely ignorant of a pre-existing defect can seek redress beyond the usual five year period and also prevents tardy or reticent, but informed persons from arbitrarily extending the time
within which they may file for damages. In addition, the decision overturned the Duffy holding and conclusively established
98. 31 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 335 N.E.2d 588 (1975).
99. See note 86 supra.
100. 31 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 333 N.E.2d at 66 (citing Rozny v. Marnul,
43 Ill. 2d 54, 72-73, 250 N.E.2d 656, 665 (1969) ). Rozny v. Marnul, a 1969
Illinois Supreme Court case, represents the initial application of the discovery rule in the state. Notwithstanding that the particular defect was

discovered more than five years after it was actually committed, the
court held that the cause of action accrued "when [the plaintiffs] knew
or should have known of the defendant's error" and that suit must be
brought within five years of that time. Id. at 72, 250 N.E.2d at 666.
101. 10 Ill. App. 3d 273, 275-76, 293 N.E.2d 187, 189 (1973).
102. Auster v. Keck, 31 Ill. App. 3d 61, 65, 333 N.E.2d 65, 68-69 (1975)
(citing Coumoulas v. Service Gas Inc., 10 Ill. App. 3d 273, 275-76, 293
N.E.2d 187, 189 (1973) ).
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Illinois as a date of discovery state when defining the language
''cause of action accrued."
Although on appeal the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
lower court's application of date of discovery logic when interpreting statute of limitations questions in malpractice actions,1'
the nature of the pleadings required by the supreme court merits
study. Defendant architect appealed the judgment on the basis
that the plaintiff's amended count I1 ° 4 failed to state a cause
of action. Agreeing with the architects and reversing the judgment against them, the court required what appears to be an
unprecedented and potentially impossible standard of proof.
Because the plaintiffs were second purchasers of the residence, they simply alleged that they had no knowledge of the
defect prior to its appearance after they took possession. 10 5 The
court noted that the complaint was silent with respect to the
knowledge or lack thereof that the prior owners had concerning
the existence of the defect. 10 6 This omission was fatal to the
0 7
plaintiffs' cause of action.1
Possible ramifications of this holding must be carefully considered. While discovery rule logic remains in force, the pleadings and corresponding proof' 08 that will now be required by
the courts present a remote purchaser' 0 9 of realty in Illinois with
grave problems. While merely alleging lack of knowledge on the
part of all prior owners is a simple matter, the proof that may
subsequently be required could prove to be a nearly impossible
task of witness location and testimony compilation. Consider the
plight of a commercial landlord who is perhaps the fourth or
fifth owner of a facility which may well be over ten years old. 1 0
Should a structural failure and resultant injury occur, the very
existence of a cause of action depends on the landlord's ability
103. 63 Ill. 2d 485, 349 N.E.2d 20 (1976).
104. Amended count II of the complaint was directed against the architect and alleged, inter alia, that the design of the house was defective
and that the plaintiffs had no knowledge thereof prior to their injury.
Nothing was said as to the knowledge of the prior owner. Id. at 486,
349 N.E.2d at 21.
105. Id. at 487, 349 N.E.2d at 21.
106. Id. at 488, 349 N.E.2d at 22.
107. Id.
108. It is an indisputable axiom of civil procedure that the proofs must
conform to the pleadings.
109. A "remote purchaser" is ordinarily one who purchases and takes
possession of a structure after an initial or subsequent owner-occupant.
It is a person who is other than the first purchaser of the structure in
question.
110. While the Auster opinion applies only to property owners, arguable analogies can be drawn to situations involving real estate leases.
The problems inherent in obtaining the required proofs from prior owners-usually a reasonably limited group-multiply greatly if similar
proofs will be required of former lessees-ordinarily a far more expansive and numerous group.
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to use the discovery rule in applying the statute of limitations."'
However, in order to do so the landlord must allege and prove
lack of knowledge on the part of all previous owners, some of
whom may have moved, dissolved their corporation, merged their
organization or worst of all, died. 1 2 Assuming that all former
owners can be located, the considerable task of obtaining the required testimony from them remains. Thus, the more remote
the plaintiff-purchaser, the greater the logistical problem of
proof. 11
Even though the supreme court upheld the application of
the discovery rule to design professional malpractice actions in
Illinois, the burden imposed upon a remote purchaser with respect to the proof required to sustain his action seriously weakens
the very vitality of the remedy itself. Whatever the ultimate
resolution, the final Auster ruling is sure to become a fertile
source of litigation.
Society of Mount Carmel v. Fox
If there was any question concerning the finality of the holding of the lower court in Auster, the subsequent ruling in Society
of Mount Carmel v. Fox"1 4 dispelled all doubts. The major issue
presented to the court in Fox involved a determination of the
date on which a cause of action accrues when dealing with a
claim of architectural malpractice. As in Auster, the court applied the discovery rule to determine that a cause of action accrues "when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the
error" 1 5 and not necessarily at the time when the defect did
111. See notes 99-100 and accompanying text supra.

112. The intrinsic difficulties of proving that a former owner-occupant,

now deceased, had no knowledge of any defects (such proof being im-

plicitly required by the Auster decision) are best left to the more ambitious areas of the imagination.
113. One possible solution to the potential difficulties posed by the
Auster holding would be to require every former purchaser of real property to sign an affidavit prior to sale. Such an affidavit essentially
would function as a declaration stating that the seller has no knowledge
of defects and would be available for use in the event of a potential
malpractice action. While this would arguably alleviate the tracking
down of prior purchasers and the obtaining of their testimony, the idea of
making such an affidavit an ordinary aspect of every closing seems rad-

ical. In any event, it would not assist those who are already remote purchasers by definition.
114. 31 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 335 N.E.2d 588 (1975).
115. Id. at 1061, 335 N.E.2d at 589. Section 16 of chapter 83 provides
that any action to recover for property damage must be brought within
five years of the date on which the cause of action accrues.

By 1963,

the school complex defendant designed had been built and sometime
thereafter plaintiff noticed structural defects such as cracks, bulges and
movement.

Defendant was consulted and advised that the problems

were maintenance related. Notwithstanding repeated repairs, the defects
persisted and in 1969, subsequent to an independent inspection, plaintiff
was informed that the problem was not one of maintenance but of a
design flaw. In 1970, plaintiff instituted an action alleging negligence
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in fact come into being. By so holding, the court was able to
support the plaintiff's contention that the cause of action accrued
in 1969, some six years after construction, when it obtained the
results of a professional investigation and learned for the first
time of the existence of a design flaw.
Quoting from Rozny v. Marnul,116 the court noted the burden
that the discovery rule places on the design professional: "The
basic problem is one of balancing the increase in difficulty of
proof which accompanies the passage of time against the hardship
to the plaintiff who neither knows nor should have known of
the existence of his right to sue."' 11 Counterbalancing the difficulty, though not mentioned by the court, is section 58 of chapter
5111s which provides a presumption of reasonable care in design
after six years of cohesive structural stability without major or
unusual problems. Because in this case there were severe structural problems almost from the close of construction, the statute
had no application.
Present Status of the Law
It seems well settled that a design professional remains liable
for his negligence in design or specification and for negligent supervision should such activity go beyond verifying technical compliance with the controlling contract documents. If a structure
remains trouble-free and fails to cause injury for a period of six
years after completion, there is a presumption, of undetermined
persuasiveness, that reasonable care was used in its design and
construction. If defects do develop, then an injured party may
sue the design professional within the time specified by the applicable statute of limitations, measured from the date of discovery,
i.e., the time of the claimant's injury. Thus, under Illinois law
today it is entirely possible for an architect or like practitioner
to remain perpetually liable for any litigable mishap traceable
to a structure with which he was connected. This remains true
irrespective of how much time elapses between the rendition of
services and the receipt of injury.
on the part of the defendant in failing to provide for expansion joints.
Defendant answered that the five year statute of limitations began to
run, pursuant to section 16 of chapter 83, on or about 1963 when the
structural defects were first manifest. Thus, the defendant claimed that
the statute ran out in 1968.
The trial court gave summary judgment to the defendant on the
basis that the complaint was not filed within the five year limit, measured from the date of completion of construction as prescribed by the

statute.
116. 43 Ill. 2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 664 (1969).
117. 31 Ill. App. 3d at 1062, 333 N.E.2d at 590 (citing Rozny v. Marnul,
43 Ill. App. 2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 664 (1969) ).
118. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 58 (1975). See also notes 76-77 and ac-

companying text supra.
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THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE

By way of comparison, the experience with professional malpractice litigation in New York offers a graphic contrast. In 1962
the New York legislature enacted a professional malpractice statute of limitations. 119

In substance, it provides that any cause

of action arising out of work performed by a professional must
be litigated within three years after such cause of action accrues.
As in other jurisdictions, the precise time that the cause of action
accrues had been a matter of speculation: does it accrue upon
discovery of the defect 120 or upon initial occurrence, i.e., design
and completion of construction? In 1974 the question was au121
thoritatively answered in the case of Sosnow v. Paul.
Before discussing the Sosnow case, some mention of Inman
v. Binghamton Housing Authority 22 must be made. Prior to
Inman it was widely held that any action against an architect
based on negligence must be grounded on the contract between
the architect and his client. Hence, only the client had standing
to sue the design professional. In this manner, third party claims
against architects or engineers were unknown and a design professional's liability was correspondingly limited. In 1957 the New
York Court of Appeals put to rest the fiction of privity and thus
vastly widened the ambit of the design professional's liability.
Although Illinois never formally adopted the Inman decision, the
reference to its holding in Miller v. DeWitt,123 and the existence
of third party suits against design professionals indicates that
the Inman reasoning has been impliedly adopted in Illinois as
well as elsewhere.
In Sosnow,124 the defendant-architect was retained in 1961
by the plaintiff-owner to design an apartment complex. The
project was completed in 1965 and at least three years later the
plaintiff began to notice various defects which ultimately occasioned the legal action that was subsequently commenced in 1971.
Defendant moved to dismiss based upon the three year statute
of limitations provided by the New York Civil Practice Law and
119.

N.Y. CPLR § 214:6 (McKinney 1962).

120. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
121. 43 App. Div. 2d 978, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1974), aff'd 36 N.Y.2d 780,
330 N.E.2d 643, 369 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1975).
122. 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957). Plaintiff
was a minor and tenant of defendant's housing project. He was injured
when he fell from an open porch and sued defendant Housing Authority, architects and others. While no recovery was allowed, it marked
the first time that a third party was permitted to press a claim against
a design professional in the absence of any contractual relationship.
123. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
124. 43 App. Div. 2d 978, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1974), aff'd 36 N.Y.2d 780,
330 N.E.2d 643, 369 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1975). The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the appellate division by issuing a memorandum opinion, thus
all further Sosnow citation will be to the appellate division decision.
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Rules, section 214. The trial court held that the professional malpractice statute of limitations was of the discovery variety and
hence the action did not accrue until the plaintiff actually discovered the defects. 125 On appeal, the appellate division reversed,
ruling that section 214 was an occurrence type statute and that
the time began to run when the professional had completed his
services. On further appeal to the New York Court of Appeals,
the state's highest court, the appellate division was upheld in
a unanimous decision: "The rule in cases where the gravamen
of the suit is professional malpractice is now and always has been
that the cause of action accrues upon performance of the work
' 126
by the professional.'
In effect, this ruling stipulates a three year period during
which a structure is "on trial." As measured from the date of
substantial completion, if no litigable injury occurs within three
years, then any later defects will not give rise to an action by
an owner against the architect.
Of course, this ruling would not directly apply to an action
by an injured third party against an architect, as such a person
would ordinarily be governed by the Inman decision. 127 It is,
however, notable that Inman requires the presence of a latent
defect to give rise to the third party's action. In Sosnow, the
failure of the architect to specify expansion joints 28 (which was
found to be the cause of the structural defects) was not deemed
to be latent. Based on this reasoning, third parties may have
a very difficult time in proving a "latent defect" and thus avoiding the strict three year rule of Sosnow.
In Illinois, the applicable statutes of limitations, when applied to design professionals, are interpreted as discovery type
statutes and thus the cause of action accrues upon injury or damage and not as of the date of occurrence or substantial construction. Under section 58 of chapter 51129 a presumption of reasonable care in design is established if, after six years, no defects
are disclosed by a structure. A mere presumption in favor of
an architect, however, is not nearly as valuable as an absolute
statutory bar on legal action. Thus, New York appears to have
125. 43 App. Div. 2d at 980, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
126. Id.
127. See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
128. An expansion joint is a device inserted between structural components which permits a controlled amount of movement to occur between the components thus separated. Expansion joints are necessary
to allow materials sensitive to weather to expand and contract without
damage. The absence of such devices would seem to be in the nature
of a latent defect in that it would require great changes of temperature
to produce the visible signs (e.g., cracks, bulges, 'movement) which
would indicate absence thereof to an untrained individual.
129. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra.
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the least liberal statute of limitations in the country with respect
to actions against design professionals. Of course the constitutionality of such a statute remains at least arguably questionable
under the same theory raised by the plaintiff in Skinner v. Anderson,13 0 the case in which section 29 of chapter 83 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes was found to be unconstitutional.
Following the Sosnow decision was the recent New York appellate court case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. ENCO Associates,
Inc. 3 1 After establishing the proposition that when a claim
sounds in malpractice, regardless of its classification, the malpractice statute of limitations'
shall be applied, 1 33 the appellate
division approved the trial court's application of the Sosnow decision: "[A] n action against an architect accrues upon the completion of the building and not upon the discovery of the building's

defects ....

134

The clock does not begin to run from the dis-

covery of the defects but rather from the accrual of the cause
35
of action.'
The court in Sears noted that if it were to apply a date of
discovery interpretation to the statute of limitations it would be
"imposing an open-ended, inchoate obligation, virtually in per3 6
petuity.'
Thus, the New York legislature and courts have combined
to provide design professionals' 37 with the security of calculable
litigation parameters which has both enticed and eluded their
Illinois counterparts. This was accomplished by enacting a special statute of limitations and judicially defining "cause of action
accrued" to refer to the date of occurrence as opposed to the Illinois preference for date of discovery.
CONCLUSION

Every individual in the United States benefits from the services of a design professional. Without shelter, the enjoyment of
food, clothing, rest and relaxation would be far less pleasant and
130. 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967).

See note 93 and accompany-

ing text supra.
131. 54 App. Div. 2d 13, 385 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1976).
132. N.Y. CPLR § 214:6 (McKinney 1962).

133. 54 App. Div. 2d at -, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 614.
134. Id.
135. Id. at -, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
136.- Id. at -, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
137. While the statute is worded in terms of "malpractice" without
differentiating the professionals to whom it can apply, the recent addition of special section 214-a indicates that the medical profession cannot
enjoy the same security given to architects, engineers, accountants and
lawyers by the regular provisions of section 214:6.

It is worth noting

that section 214-a was enacted mainly as the result of numerous court
holdings that the date-of-occurrence interpretation given to other professional malpractice litigation brought under N.Y. CPLR 214:6 did not
apply to medical malpractice cases because of their extraordinary nature.
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questionably useful. Just as the architect protects mankind from
nature's hostility, so he now seeks protection from the threatening specter of perpetual liability for injury arising out of the
rendition of his professional services. Although not expecting
to escape all liability for fault, the design professional does desire
legal guidelines that will enable him to establish to a reasonable
degree of certainty when he can be relieved of the burden of
defending a malpractice charge arising out of a mishap within
a given structure. When we secure the services of a design professional, we expect him to create a structure which is cohesive,
reliable and enduring. Is the design professional not entitled to
similar protection from the legislature and judiciary?
Todd L. Herbst

